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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THE VALIDITY OF URBAN RENEWAL IN COLORADO
By

HAROLD

E.

HURST*

This article is written to review the constitutional law and administrative law decisions of the Supreme Court of Colorado during
1961.
A reading of the 1961 decisions disclosed none that are classifiable as administrative law decisions. Most of the constitutional law
decisions were routine and not of much importance. Rather than
digest many cases with only routine significance, an election has
been made to confine comment to the one case which involved a
very difficult and important question and stirred vehement disagreement among the members of the court.
I.

URBAN

RENEWAL -

TAKING PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PRIVATE USE?

The case involved the highly controversial questions in the urban renewal litigation 1 which dispossessed property owners, and
resulted in clearing of properties of the then existing buildings, and
resale of most of the property by the Urban Renewal Authority to
private concerns for industrial and multiple unit housing uses.
The case arose as a result of the condemnation by the Urban
Renewal Authority of property of the plaintiffs, part of 150 acres of
property in west Denver. The project which gave rise to the case
is otherwise known as the Avondale Project, at the west end of the
Colfax Avenue viaduct, approximately one and one-half miles west
of the downtown business district of Denver.
The condemnation proceedings were commenced pursuant to
the Urban Renewal Act,2 authorizing cities, through Urban Renewal
Authorities, to condemn slum and blighted areas and to "redevelop"
such areas by sale to private individuals or corporations.
The plaintiff property owners resisted the condemnation actions
initiated by the Authority. The principal contention of the plaintiffs was that the Urban Renewal Law and the action taken thereunder by Denver and the Authority violated the state constitution
which provides limitations on state legislative authority as follows:
Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of
necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains,flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others, for agricultural,
mining,
3
milling, domestic or sanitary purposes.
Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for
public or private use without just compensation. .

.

. and

whenever an attempt is made to take private property for
a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question,
and determined as such without4 regard to any legislative
assertion that the use is public.
* Dean of the University of Denver College of Low.
1 Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1961).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 139-62-1 to 139-62-14 (Supp. 1960).
3 Cola. Const. art. II, § 14. (Emphasis supplied.)
4Cola. Cons?, art. II, § 15. (Emphasis supplied.)
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A. Is Urban Renewal a Public or a Private Use?
In considering the principal question posed, the court said:
The narrow inquiry, therefore, is whether the power
of eminent domain can be exercised in circumstances such
as the present, wherein the public authority does not intend
to permanently retain the property which it proposes to
condemn. We do not consider the actual use by the public
after the taking to be the appropriatetest as to whether or
not the use is a public one. The main object of this legislation is to eliminate slum and blighted areas as defined
in the act. ...5

If the use to which property is to be put is not the "appropriate
test," then what is? And if "actual use by the public after the taking" is not the appropriate test, why does the Colorado Constitution 6 provide specifically that "whenever an attempt is made to take
private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question. ..."?

Analysis of the constitutional provisions7 makes it perfectly
clear that the people intended to and did establish the following
principles for the protection of property ownership:
1. Private property shall not be taken for either a public or a
private use without just compensation.
2. Private property shall not be taken for a private use except
for carefully specified purposes.
3. Whenever an attempt is made to take property for a use alleged to be public, the courts are to decide whether the use be really
public.
The only purpose which the last principle can serve is to determine if the contemplated use be public (in which case the constitution imposes no limit upon the purpose of the taking) or private
(in which case the constitution permits the taking only for certain
named purposes). Slum clearance and urban renewal are not permissible objects or purposes which will support taking private property for private use.
The foregoing consideration returns us to the question whether
the taking of private property, clearing it of improvements, and
selling the property to private developers, is a public use or a private use. There can be no doubt concerning the answer to this
question because it is manifest, on the face of the Urban Renewal
Act that the legislature, the city council and the Renewal Authority
intended to take the property for the sole purpose of distributing it
to other private owners.
An authority may sell, lease or otherwise transfer real
property or any interest therein acquired by it as a part of
an urban renewal project, for residential, recreational, commercial, industrial or other uses, or for public use .... 8
An authority may dispose of real property in an urban
renewal area to private persons ....9
5
6
,
8
9

Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114, 118 (Colo. 1961). (Emphasis supplied.)
Colo. Const. art. II, § 15.
Colo. Const. art. II, 1514, 15.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-62-6(1) (Supp. 1960).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-62-6(2) (Supp. 1960).
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An authority cannot undertake an urban renewal project unless the city council approves the project, which approval may be
given if the council finds that "the urban renewal plan will afford
maximum opportunity, consistent with the sound needs of the
municipality as a whole, for the rehabilitation or redevelopment of
the urban renewal area by private enterprise."'10
Language could not make it clearer that the legislative purpose
was not to take the lands for public use, but to take private property
from the owners and redistribute it to other private owners. Any
other meaning given to the language of the act does violence to the
plain and ordinary meaning of the words used.
After determining that it does not consider the public use of the
property after its taking to be the appropriate test, the court says,
"The main object of this legislation is to eliminate slum and blighted areas as defined in the act,"" and "The acquisition and transfer
to private parties is a mere incident of the chief purpose of the act
which is rehabilitation of the area."'1 2 The court then cited numerous cases sustaining urban renewal acts in other states, and in the
United States Supreme Court, and of them said:
All of these cases emphasize that the acquisition of
properties and the elimination of their slum or blighted
character constitutes a public purpose; that what is involved is an urban reclamation project; and the fact that
when the redevelopment is achieved the properties are sold
to private individuals for the purpose of 3development does
not rob the taking of its public purpose.1
What the court has failed to perceive is that all legislation by
the General Assembly must be calculated to achieve a public purpose if it is to be valid. The question here is not whether a public
purpose is being achieved, but rather whether it is being achieved
by a taking for a public or a private use. The latter question won't
just go away and hide behind the blind and easy references to public purpose. We can only conclude that the court failed to carry
out its constitutional duty to decide the most important question
in the case.
The dissents 14 not only contain the more persuasive logic, but
10 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-62.7(4) (Supp. 1960). (Emphasis supplied.)
11 Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114, 118 (Colo. 1961).
12 Id. at 119.
13 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
14 Dissenting opinions were by Mr. Justice Moore, in which Mr. Justice Frantz and Chief Justice
Hall concurred, and by Mr. Justice Franti.
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also point out the dangers to the public inherent in the kind of judicial abdication indulged in by the bare majority in the Rabinoff
case.
The final blow to the dispossessed property owners was the
advertisement in the Sunday Denver Post 15 for June 17, 1962, for
sale by the Renewal Authority, of the lands which they had previously owned to private purchasers "for development."
B. The Eminent Domain Limitation in Colorado
In order to afford a better understanding of the nature and purpose of the Colorado eminent domain limitations, and of the confusion apparent in the cases which seems to have led the majority of
the Colorado court astray, it is appropriate to explore the historical
understanding of eminent domain prior to and at the time of the
adoption of the Colorado Constitution.
1. The Nature of the Power.-It is not necessary for our purpose to establish the origin of the power of eminent domain. But,
for a landmark in our consideration of the problem it seems that the
power had only begun to be discussed in England, and not at all in
the colonies, at about the time of the Jamestown and Plymouth
landings. 16 We are here more particularly concerned with the early
views as to what the power permitted governments to do by way
of taking private property.
. The raw, unlimited power of eminent domain

. . .

em-

braces all cases where, by authority of the State and for
the public good, the property of the individual is taken,
without l is consent, for the purpose of being devoted to
some particular use, either by the state itself or by a corporation, public or private, or by a private citizen. This
definition relates to the power of eminent
domain as it
7
exists unrestricted in the sovereign state.
The power of eminent domain, thus defined, is nothing more
nor less than a facet of the police power -the power to legislate
with regard to persons and their property to promote the public
health, welfare, safety and morals. Indeed, Judge Cooley defined
the power as "the rightful authority, which exists in every sovereignty, to control and regulate those rights of a public nature
which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public safety,
necessity, convenience, or welfare may demand."18
In the modern edition of Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain,
as revised by Sackman and van Brunt, we find the power defined
as follows:
Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take
property for public use without the owner's consent. This
definition expresses the meaning of the power in its irreducible terms:
(a) Power to take,
(b) Without the owner's consent,
(c) For the public use.
15
16
17
18

Denver Post, June 17, 1962, p. 6D, col. 6-8.
1 Nichols, Eminent Domain 40 (3rd ed. 1950).
Lewis, Eminent Domain in the United States 1-2 (3rd ed. 19091.
2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 1110 (8th ed. 1927),
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All else that may be found in the numerous definitions
which have received judicial recognition is merely by way
of limitation or qualification of the power. As a matter of
pure logic it might be argued that inclusion of the term "for
the public use" is also by way of limitation. In this connection, however, it should be pointed out that from the very
beginning of the exercise of the power the concept of the
"public use" has been so inextricably related to a proper
exercise of the power that such element must be considered as essential in any statement of its meaning. The
"public use" element is set forth in some definitions as the
"general welfare," the "welfare of the public," the "public
good," the "public benefit," or "public utility or necessity." 19
It appears quite clearly, from the historical works alluded to
above, and others, that the power to take private property for public use is most properly considered a power inherent in sovereignty
and unlimited, except, as every power in our system, to the achievement of a public purpose as broadly defined. And, as one work
puts it:
It does not require recognition by constitutional provision, but exists in absolute and unlimited form. Under this
doctrine, therefore, positive assertion of limitations upon
the power is required. This requirement is met by the provisions found in most of the state constitutions relating to
the taking of property by eminent domain. Such constitutional provisions neither directly nor impliedly grant the
power of eminent domain, but are simply limitations upon
a power already
in existence which would otherwise be
20
unlimited.
2. The Nature of Limitations of the Power.-On Independence
Day very few of the original thirteen states had constitutional limitations upon the power of eminent domain, and very few adopted
limitations within the immediate years thereafter. North Carolina
has no constitutional limitation even today. Georgia had no limitation until 1865, and South Carolina until 1868.21
Madison, Hamilton and Jay felt it necessary to submit a Bill of
Rights to the states to help carry the ratification of the Constitution
of the United States..2 2 It is singular that although many of the
states had no constitutional limitations on this power of eminent
domain, the Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights provided: That
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Today, all states except North Carolina have constitutional23
limitations upon the power of eminent domain. All such states
prohibit the taking of property except upon payment of "just," "reasonable," or "full" compensation, or the "equivalent in money. "24
19 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain 2-3 (3rd ed. 1950). As to whether the words "public use" constitute a limitation, see Lewis, Eminent Domain p. vi (3rd ed. 1909).
20 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain 14-16 (3rd ed. 1950). See also Lewis, Eminent Domain 21 (3rd ed.
1909).
21 For dates on which the various states adopted constitutional limitations, see 1 Nichols, Eminent
Domain 52-55 (3rd ed. 1950); Lewis, Eminent Domain 28-50 (3rd ed. 1909).
22 Swisher, American Constitutional Development 43-44 (1943).
23 New Hampshire, however, only requires that the taking be with the owner's consent or with
the consent of the "representative body of the people." Lewis, Eminent Domain 41 (3rd ed. 1909).
24 Lewis, op. cit. supra note 21, at 27-50.
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The limitation that just compensation must be paid for property taken for a public use, interpreted as indicated above, is the
usual one found in state constitutions. And, as we have seen above,
the term "public use" was construed by the courts to mean everything from actual use by the public to "public purpose" or "public
benefit."
The definition of the power of eminent domain in many states
permitted the taking of private property for "public use" in such
liberal terms that property could be taken for the "general welfare," the "public
good," the "public benefit," or the "public utility
2 5or necessity.
The earliest example of the taking of private property for a
"public use," which was not really for use by the public in the sense
that the public used the property, was the condemnation and overflowing of the property of others for the purpose of creating a mill
pond and a fall of water at a mill dam to turn the grinding mechanism of a flour mill. Such a taking was common in early New England. 26 Mills established as a result of the exercise of the power of
eminent domain were undoubtedly highly necessary and beneficial
to the whole public in early colonial days, but actual use was by the
mill owner.
Any doctrine, such as that accepted by some states to the effect
that a public use means any use which in any way contributes to
the public welfare, is likely to be pushed to the point of being difficult to defend. It was natural that persons having any desire at
all to invade the property rights of others would argue that the proposed use was beneficial to the public and that they should be permitted to condemn land of another for such things, for instance, as
logging roads, spur tracks from a saw mill to a railroad, for drainage of factory wastes, for recreation areas, or for a way of ingress
and egress to and from land not served by a road.
The early mill dam cases indicated that there was not only great
public benefit supplied by mills, but that no2 7miller could, morally
at least, refuse to grind the grain of another.
It was natural for the courts to extend the doctrine of the mill
dam cases to permit the taking of property for other purposes, because even though property for railroads, ferries, telephone companies and others was to be taken by private individuals or cor25 See note 17 supra.
26 For descriptive text and casessee Lewis, op. cit. supro note 21, at 544.
27 Lewis, op. cit. supra note 21, at 547.
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porations, and used for private profit, the public was to be permitted the use of the facilities.
More serious questions arose when the mill dam doctrine was
urged as precedent for permitting the taking of property for private
uses which indirectly and incidentally benefitted the public, but
which property the public had neither any right to use nor any interest in using. Certain ways of necessity, such as logging roads,
mining roads, cable trams for carrying ore from mine to mill, ditches and flumes to carry water from its source to a farmer's land, and
many others, were frequently sought to be condemned as taking
for public use.
Because the courts were finding difficulty in establishing the
boundary between takings of private property for public uses and
takings of private property for private uses, it was inevitable that
modifications in constitutions would be sought which would establish such a boundary.
3. Later ConstitutionalDevelopments.-In the latter part of the
nineteenth century another kind of limitation began to appear in
state constitutions. Before 1876 (the year in which the Colorado
Constitution was adopted) a number of states had adopted constitutional limitations seemingly calculated to restrict the scope given
to the prevailing constitutional limitations.
A really broad-sweeping, new kind of limitation was adopted
as a constitutional provision in Missouri in 1875, prohibiting the taking of private property "for private use . . . except for ways of ne-

cessity, and except for drains and ditches across the lands of others
for agricultural and sanitary purposes ...

and whenever an attempt

is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the
question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a
judicial question, and as such judicially determined, without regard
to any legislative assertion that the use is public."
The Missouri limitation was adopted in virtually the same form
(but with sufficient difference in each case to indicate that careful
consideration was given to the suitability of the limitation to each
state) in the Colorado Constitution of 1876, the constitutiodns of Wyoming and Washington in 1889, and of Oklahoma in 1907. Illinois
in 1878, and New York in 1894 adopted or extended existing constitutional limitations along the same line. In 1889 Montana and
Idaho adopted constitutional provisions declaring private use of
ways to conduct water to reservoirs, and through ditches, flumes
and other ways to be public uses. 8
In passing, it should be noted that not all of the constitutional
developments indicated above were in the constitutions of new
states. Quite apparently there were problems in connection with
the taking of property for private uses that were recognized as in
need of correction in the states of Missouri, New York, Illinois and
Oklahoma. And just as apparently, the constitutional conventions
of new states coming into the Union recognized the necessity for
placing more specific limits on the power of eminent domain.
4. Comparative Interpretation of the New v. the Old Kind of
Constitutional Limitation.-Almost beyond question, the states
which revised their constitutions, and the new states coming into
"S For all the limitations indicated in the paragraph, see Lewis, op. cit. supra note 21, at 28-50.
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the Union, recognized that the doctrine allowing "for a public use"
to mean "for a public purpose" had been carried too far. The adoption of the new kind of limitation appearing in the Missouri Constitution of 1875 could mean nothing else.
It is interesting and instructive to sample a few opinions handed
down in the early period of the new limitation.
Illustrative, in the West, of contemporary judicial interpretation of the old, traditional prohibition that property shall not be
taken for a public use without compensation is the Nevada case of
Dayton Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Seawell. 29 A mine operator
wanted a right of way over lands of others to take in timbers and
other supplies and to bring out ores. The court posed the principal
question for decision: "What is the meaning of the words 'public
use' as contained in the provision of our state constitution?"
Some indication of the reason for the new kind of limitation being adopted by both new and older states at that time may be ascertained from the language of the learned Nevada court:
No question has ever been submitted to the courts upon
which there is a greater variety and conflict of reasoning
and results than that presented as to the meaning of the
words "public use" as found in the different state constitutions regulating the right of eminent domain. The reasoning is in many of the cases as unsatisfactory as the results
have been uncertain. The beaten path of precedent to which
courts, when in doubt, seek refuge, here furnishes no safe
guide to lead us through the long lane of uncertainty to
the open highway of public justice and of right. The authorities are so diverse and conflicting, that no matter
which road the court may take it will be sustained, and
opposed, by about an equal number of the decided cases.
In this dilemma, the meaning must, in every case, be determined by the common sense of each individual judge
who has the power of deciding it. Upon examing the authorities, we find that private property has been taken
under a similar provision in the different state constitutions, for the purpose of making public highways, turnpike
roads, and canals; of building railroads; of constructing
wharves and basins; of establishing ferries; of draining
swamps and marshes; of bringing water into cities and
towns; of the establishment of water-power for manufacturing purposes; of laying out a public park; of constructing
sewers; of erecting levees, to prevent inundation; of building lateral railroads to coal mines; of laying pipe for the
transportation of oil from oil-wells to a railroad; of laying
gas-pipes; of disposing of stagnant and offensive water,
etc., etcY0
The Nevada court sustained the taking, on the authority of the
mill pond cases mentioned above, but not without some misgivings
as to the validity of the analogy. The way of precedent is hard; but
the way of independent thinking, by appellate courts, is harder still.
Better that the people would amend the constitution!
29 11 Nev. 394 (1876).
30 Id. at 400-401.
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Proceeding from the old to the new kind of constitutional
pro3
vision, we examine a case from the state of Washington. 1
The plaintiff, who had no way to get his saw logs to a mill,
sought a right of way across the land of another.
We will recall that Washington had, in 1889, adopted a constitution which provided that: Private property shall not be taken for
private use, except for private ways of necessity, and for drains,
31 Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pc. 681 (1903).
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flumes or ditches on or across the lands of another for agricultural,
domestic or sanitary purposes.
The plaintiff relied heavily on the doctrine of the mill dam cases
and urged the large element of public benefit to be created by his
logging operation as the element which would sustain his appropriation of defendant's property as a public use.
While conceding that there were many authorities following the
mill dam doctrine, the Washington court pointed out that those authorities were about equally balanced by decisions rejecting attempts to appropriate private property for private use on the theory
that the private use would produce public benefit.
Characterizing the mill dam doctrine as "dangerous," the Washington court said:
It seems scarcely necessary to particularize to show to
what extent this doctrine might practically be carried. Under such liberal construction, the brewer could successfully
demand condemnation of his neighbor's land for the purpose of the erection of a brewery, because, forsooth, many
citizens of the state are profitably engaged in the cultivation of hops. Condemnation would be in order for gristmills and for factories for manufacturing the cereals of the
state, because there is a large agricultural interest to be
sustained. Tanneries, woolen factories, oil refineries, distilleries, packing houses, and machine shops of almost every
conceivable kind would be entitled to some consideration
for the same reasons; thereby actually destroying any distinctions between public and private use, for the principle
in one instance is 2the same as in the other. The difference
is only in degree.
The Washington court rejected the mill dam doctrine, pointing
out that only Colorado and Missouri had constitutional provisions
regarding condemnation for a private use, and said:
That fact eliminates from the discussion in this case all that
line of cases which hold that the fact that the Legislature
has either pronounced a certain thing a public use, or has
so indicated by its enactment, by conferring the right of
eminent domain, ought to have great weight with the court
in construing the constitutionality of the act, because our
Constitution has expressly negatived any such idea; . . .3
Having thus expressed itself upon the question of the difference between the Washington eminent domain limitations and those
of most other states, the court held that the kind of way desired by
the plaintiff was not a "way of necessity" 34 and the contemplated
use did not qualify as one of the other private uses for which the
power of eminent domain was available under the Washington Constitution.
5. Development and Application of the Colorado Limitation.It is unfortunate that the Proceedings of the Colorado Constitutional Convention, held in 1875, do not contain any record of the
comments or debates on proposed provisions. However, it would be
32 Id. at 684.
33 Id. at 682.
34 Because at commn
law a way of necessity could be raised only out of land granted or
reserved by the grantor, and the defendant was a stranger to plaintiff's title.
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assuming too much to believe that the Committee on the Bill of
Rights, in proposing the new limitations on the power of eminent
domain, were not cognizant of the confusion that existed at that
time regarding the diversity in the cases which held that "for a
public use" meant everything from "use by the public" to "any use
by anybody that produces some public benefit." Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that there were large land holders in the convention desirous of insuring their ability to put water on their lands,
and that there were in the convention mining men intent on safeguarding their right to get men and materials to their mines and
their ores out. It is equally reasonable to assume that there were
land owners in the delegations who recognized the threat to their
holdings arising from miners, loggers and others who wanted constitutional sanction for private ways that would facilitate their
exploitation of natural resources.
It is not, therefore, to be supposed that the strangely new provision limiting the power of eminent domain written into the Colorado Constitution was a mere paraphrase or the result of a desire
to use refreshing new language to communicate old concepts. Lawyers just don't do things that way. They prefer to adhere to words
and phrases that have become technical in their meaning by virtue
of repeated use and judicial construction. Knowing the legal profession and its traditional way of operating, and knowing that constitutional conventions are the occasions most surely to invite presentation of all conflicting interests, we can be reasonably certain
that the language used in the Constitution of 1876 was meant to
change and make more specific the fundamental law as to what was
and what was not a permissible taking of private property in Colorado.
The Supreme Court of Colorado had occasion to apply the new
and different constitutional limitation in a decision only eleven
years after adoption of the constitution.35 The plaintiff sought to
condemn land for a private railroad over land of others, to take out
ore, claiming a right to do so under section 2407 of the General
Statutes of Colorado. The question of public benefit to be derived
from facilitating the mining industry, admittedly a matter of great
public benefit in those days, was not much labored in the case.
The court, with economy of words, held that "The right to condemn and appropriate private property, in the present case, being
for a private use, no argument is necessary to show that the taking of private property for the construction of a tramway does not
fall within the exceptions specified, to which the legislative power
is limited by the constitution."
It is somewhat singular that this case, although cited in the
petitioners' brief, was not mentioned by either the majority or minority opinions in Rabinoff.
II.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the Rabinoff case, urban renewal was sustained in Colorado.
The purported authority for urban, renewal, the Urban Renewal
Law enacted by the Colorado General Assembly, provides for the
creation of urban renewal authorities by cities. Clearly and un35 People

. District Court, 11 Colo. 147, 17 Pac. 298 (1887).
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equivocally, the intent of the legislature, manifest in the words of
the act, is to take possession and title of private property in areas
which are determined to be slums or blighted, to destroy the buildings and terminate the uses which are the source of slums and
blight, and to return the lands to other private owners for profitable exploitation.
In Rabinoff it was stipulated by both parties that the avowed
purpose of the undertaking by the authority is to acquire the properties by purchase or condemnation and as soon as possible thereafter sell a substantial portion of the properties to other persons
or corporations for redevelopment. In the process another objective
is to be achieved, namely, the elimination of slums and blight.
It was conceded by all that slum clearance is a proper objective
for exercise of police power. But the petitioners urged that the
avowed objective of taking their property for the purpose of reselling it to other private developers is prohibited by the Colorado Constitution which specifically prohibits taking private property for
private use except for certain kinds of uses.
The court rejected the contention, holding that the taking was
not for a private use, but for a public purpose, and for support for
its holding alluded to the fact that urban renewal had been sustained in nearly every state in which questioned, and by the Supreme Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. In
so holding, it is obvious that the bare majority of the Colorado court
completely disregarded the unequivocal language of the constitution. The court also overlooked the fact that Colorado and a few
other states have constitutional prohibitions much more restrictive
than the constitutions of most states and of the federal government
which only prohibit taking property for public use without just
compensation. It was inevitable that the majority of the state decisions, with which the majority of the court were so impressed,
would be different from decisions based upon the kind of limitation
found in the Colorado Constitution.
The extreme confusion in the various interpretations of the
eminent domain limitations usually found in state constitutions, at
the time of the Colorado constitutional convention, clearly suggests
that the convention wrote a new and different kind of limitation
into the Colorado Constitution deliberately and for the very purpose of preventing the kind of decision represented by Rabinoff.
The only objective that could possibly be served by the new
and different kind of prohibition was to make it clear that in Colorado private property was not to be taken for private use on the
theory that the new use served a public purpose and for that reason constituted a public use; and to make it crystal clear that private property cannot be taken and devoted to a private use as a
means of achieving some legitimate end.
The error in the Colorado decision lies in the failure by the
court to recognize that, in sustaining the public purpose to be
achieved by the Urban Renewal Law (slum and blight removal),
it approved the achievement of that quite legitimate end by a means
(taking private property for private use) specifically prohibited by
the constitution.

